

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800100017-0

NSC BRIEFING

6 August 1957

RECENT SOVIET MOVES IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD

I. The Khrushchev-Tito secret meeting in Rumania on 1 and 2 August represents the most significant Soviet foreign policy move since the Presidium shake-up late last June.

A. Khrushchev moved with remarkable speed after his announcement at the time of the purge that Molotov had been responsible for the deterioration in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. He held ideological talks with Yugoslav leaders Kardelj and Rankovic in Moscow in mid-July, removed the freeze on Soviet credits to Yugoslavia in late July, sent a working level Soviet party delegation to Belgrade at the end of the month, and, finally, met with Tito in Rumania.

B. Khrushchev may also be ready to pressure both Albania and Bulgaria--Tito's two prime Satellite enemies--into an accomodation with Tito.

II. The Rumanian meeting apparently restores Moscow-Belgrade relations to a status comparable to that achieved at the time of Tito's Moscow visit in June 1956. The meeting, as a matter of fact, specifically reaffirmed the joint declaration issued by the two leaders at the time of last year's visit.

A. The Rumanian meeting does not mean that a genuine compromise has been reached, even now. The leaders admit that obstacles remain to be overcome before further rapprochement is possible.

B. Moscow's major goal still seems to be the return of Yugoslavia to the Bloc; Belgrade's goal is friendship and cooperation with

the USSR and all Communist states, with the at least long-range

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800100017-0

~~SECRET~~

2
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH:
DATE:
REVIEWER: 372044

In addition, Khrushchev may feel that according to the USSR and all Communist states, with the at least long-range (strongly in his own interest position).

aim of using their influence to develop genuinely equal relations between all Communist states (including relations between the USSR and its Satellites).

- C. Both sides are now optimistic and desire accord on as many issues as possible. ~~Thus~~ they may be working out another "agreement to disagree," each hoping the other has learned much during the past year and will eventually "see the light."

III. All "liberal" elements in the Satellites--including Gomulka--will be encouraged by the Tito-Khrushchev meeting.


- A. But all concerned have been forewarned by the Hungarian revolution and--unlike the period following the Soviet 20th Party Congress (February 1956)--the USSR has made perfectly clear its position concerning Soviet leadership of the Bloc and the need for party unity within each Satellite. Therefore, existing ferment is not likely in the near future to approach the proportions of last fall on the basis of this kind of

Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement.

- Insert A*
~~B. Old statement on Hungarian changes which may be needed to placate Tito (long follow-up)~~
IV. The Khrushchev-Tito talks emphasized, among other things, the ~~changes~~ *reforms* "special significance of strengthening the unity of Communist and workers parties" ~~and "progressive forces"~~ throughout the world. This may indicate Yugoslav willingness to join some form of new organization to replace the cominform which became defunct in the spring of 1956.

- A. Rumors of such an organization have been persistent for several months.

25X1C 1.


 Soviet Party presidium member Mikhail Suslov has been setting up a bureau in Prague to coordinate ties between Communist parties and to publish a journal.

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800100017-0

2.

25X1C



B. Khrushchev's current interest in better relations with Tito probably means that he would tailor any such new organization to suit Tito instead of excluding him.

Insert B

2. This means ~~that a new organization would have to be~~ *than the Cominform* with less centralized control, perhaps even open to non-Communist parties and leaders from outside the Orbit. This is probably also necessary to get Polish and Italian Communist support.

3. In addition to holding occasional conferences, it would probably publish a journal. *Insert C* *a compromise and* whether any such loosely organized outfit would serve Moscow's purpose of strengthening unity and discipline remains to be seen.

*1. Add statement on Tito's role in a new organization
2. Add a paragraph on editorial policy of journal -- inherent in new Cominform*

V. Khrushchev, back in Moscow from Rumania for only a few days, is now *in East Germany* off to Berlin.

A. *Bulgaria* ~~He is not being accompanied by Bulgaria~~ *ing him* as originally scheduled. This, coupled with recurring reports that his position was weakened during the purge, suggests that Bulgandin

perhaps at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet due in the next month or so
~~is likely soon to be replaced as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.~~ *may well* It also suggests that Mikoyan--who ~~is going to~~ *is* in Germany now--and Zhukov are the 2 most likely ~~possibilities as~~ *with Khrushchev*

B. The visit to East Germany during the week of 7-13 August is probably intended to demonstrate Soviet approval of this loyal satellite regime and to increase its prestige. Khrushchev

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800100017-0

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800100017-0

may reaffirm his support for East German Party boss Walter Ulbricht. [The Soviet leaders would probably do anything they could to damage Chancellor Adenauer's prospects in the September West German elections.]

- C. There are no signs of any softening in Moscow's rigid stand on German reunification, which is based on the insistence that the East and West German regimes settle the problem themselves.
- D. The Soviet leaders, however, may use this occasion to announce some "twist," such as a reduction of Soviet forces in Germany, for dramatic effect. But their basic position will probably not change.
- E. Khrushchev is also likely to endorse West German Socialist leader Ollenhauer's call for a unified, neutral Germany within a European security system, as part of his effort to demonstrate that Adenauer is an obstacle to reunification.

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800100017-0